

this resolution so we will spend our time debating the means.

If I assume that the proper ends are peace in Central America, the advancement of the economic, social, and political liberties of people in Central America, including Nicaragua, then it is appropriate for me to consider whether the policy we debate today advances those ends.

We made a decision last year in this Congress to support aid to the democratic resistance.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ARMSTRONG). The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. KENNEDY. I would be glad to yield 2 minutes to the Senator.

Mr. DURENBERGER. I thank my colleague from Massachusetts.

The important change we made last year was to move aid, which we could not admit we were giving, from lethal to nonlethal and we moved it from the military guerrilla forces to the democratic resistance, the former democratic revolutionaries, in an organization called the United Nicaraguan Opposition.

The staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee has been very careful over the last 9 months to oversee the humanitarian aid which we are attempting to provide to the United Nicaraguan Opposition. I can share with my colleagues briefly the fact that some aid is getting through. Not all \$27 million of it, but some of it is. But it is also getting in through the political arm and not through the military arm.

So to the extent that we are trying to shift our means from the support of an uncontrolled FDF military operation to a more diplomatic political operation, we have been successful. For that reason, I would suggest that my colleagues not support the very well-intentioned amendment by my colleague from Massachusetts, but, instead, support a continuation of nonlethal aid toward the political arm of the diplomatic opposition.

I fear that the Kennedy amendment rules out the means to achieve a negotiated solution, which I know he trusts will come from this process.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, how much time have I remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6 minutes remaining.

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me say that I support the Kennedy amendment, that I cosponsor it. I believe it is the correct course for us to pursue. The distinctions that we are trying to make between nonlethal and humanitarian and military aid have become meaningless from this debate and in the negotiations with the administration.

We now hear that nonlethal aid means defensive weapons but not offensive weapons. I think it is clear to

anyone who has studied this issue for 30 seconds that the difference between a defensive weapon and an offensive weapon depends upon which end of the gun you are standing on.

Clearly, we are being asked here, by the administration, to continue to fund a war which they would like to become a civil war in that country of Nicaragua. I do not believe it is an appropriate course for us. I do not believe it is designed to lead to the kind of resolution of that problem that the American people want.

The Sandinista government is stronger today within its own borders by virtue of the threat posed by the Contras with our help.

I believe the quicker we withdraw that help, the quicker we will be able to come to some kind of resolution of the situation in that part of the world.

I am proud to support Senator KENNEDY's proposal, and I commend him for making this proposal to the Senate.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, it is with unease and a sense of déjà vu that I rise today to join the debate over aid to the Contras. None of the policy questions or facts before us are new. Indeed, we as a Nation have been grappling with the Contra issue ever since the spring of 1982 and the early controversy over the Bolland amendment. Since then, we have had to revisit this issue at least once every 6 months.

In our discussions, several Senators, myself included, have explored the parallels that exist between United States involvement in Nicaragua and other countries, especially Vietnam. While I respect the differences between Southeast Asia, Central America, and the Middle East, it is important for us to heed the lessons of history—especially when we paid for them with our own flesh and blood.

Mr. President, our recent experiences in Vietnam and Lebanon have taught us several things. First, it is important for our Government to have the support of the American people in the conduct of our foreign policy—especially when it comes to war. Second, if we commit American soldiers to an armed conflict, we should do so openly and convincingly, with the intention of winning. Dispatching United States Marines to Lebanon as part of an ill-defined peace keeping mission was a painful and tragic reminder of this lesson. A corollary of this rule is that we should not take military action until we have exhausted every possible alternative, including a mediated, diplomatic solution. The United States should certainly not use military means to solve the social, economic, and political problems of our neighbors.

President Reagan's request for \$100 million in additional aid to the Contras ignores these broad lessons of his-

tory. Moreover, it ignores specific information that we have developed about the Contras' battle against the Sandinistas over the past 6 years.

Mr. President, I wish to make it very clear that I disagree with the policies and practices of the Sandinistas. It is my fervent hope that the Nicaraguan people will be able to reclaim their revolution from the Marxist ideologists who usurped it following the fall of Somoza. However, President Reagan's proposal for increased military aid is not the best means for reaching this goal. I will thus vote against further aid to the Contras for the following reasons:

First, the Contras have been ineffective in their attempts to topple the Sandinista government. Aside from weakening the Nicaraguan economy and causing hardship for ordinary citizens, the Contras have strengthened, not loosened the Sandinistas' grip on their country. The Sandinistas have used attacks by the Contras to justify first, the suspension of civil rights, second, the imposition of a draft, and third, keeping the economy on a wartime footing. Rather than encourage moderate opposition to the Sandinistas within Nicaragua, Contra attacks and atrocities against civilians have enabled the Sandinistas to focus their nation's attention on the "threat from outside." Instead of helping the democratic opposition within Nicaragua—as we sought to do in the Philippines—United States support for the Contras has consolidated the Sandinistas' control over a reluctant population.

An unfortunate byproduct of the Contra war is that we have driven the Sandinistas into the arms of the very people we want to keep out of Central America—Cubans and the Soviets. Thanks to ineffective trade embargoes and poorly executed military pressure, we have left the Sandinistas no alternative but to seek arms, foodstuffs, and economic assistance from the Soviet bloc. In so doing, we are squandering the goodwill that most Nicaraguans feel toward the United States while reinforcing the Sandinistas' caricature of Americans as bullies and aggressors.

Second, the Contras have shown that they cannot win an armed conflict against the Sandinistas. After 6 years of paramilitary action and more than \$100 million in aid from the U.S. Government alone, the Contras are no closer to their political and military objectives today than they were at the outset. The President's request that we commit another \$100 million to a losing battle is wasteful and will raise, both literally and figuratively, the United States stake in the Nicaraguan conflict. The need to place United States military advisers in Central America to supervise and train the Contras will increase, not decrease,

the likelihood of direct United States intervention in the region. By staking U.S. prestige on the outcome of the Contras' battle against the Sandinistas, the United States is taking a major step toward the commitment of U.S. troops to the conflict—an event which most Americans agree is unnecessary and undesirable.

Third, continued involvement by our Defense and Intelligence agencies in the Nicaraguan conflict is destroying their credibility and undermining their effectiveness. Our foreign policy depends on good intelligence, but the CIA's role in Nicaragua has only tarnished the agency and hampered our foreign policy. CIA activity has violated U.S. treaty obligations and international law. Rather than advance our goals, it has brought the United States adverse publicity and disrepute. In an era of increased international terrorism and espionage, it is against our national interest for the CIA or the U.S. Government to be involved with the Contras.

A final thought, Mr. President, is this: What would happen if the Contras ever win, either after years of U.S. assistance or direct U.S. military involvement? We might be able to establish a friendly government in Managua, but how would we reconcile the competing Contra factions, one of which is fighting the Sandinistas from Costa Rica, the other from Honduras? More to the point, how would we deal with the Sandinistas, who would no doubt take to the hills and return to their old style of guerrilla warfare? Is the United States prepared to occupy Nicaragua for several decades, as we did between 1912 and 1933? [Note that we never captured Augusto Cesar Sandino, the guerrilla who gave the Sandinistas their name]. What would happen to the insurgencies in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala if the Sandinistas resumed their role as revolutionaries? Would we improve the security and stability of our allies in the region, or would we further destabilize the region and realize our worst fears of terrorist attacks against the southern border of the United States?

It is clear that peace in Central America depends on a negotiated, political solution involving all the key players in the region. The United States should join the Governments of Central and South America in the Contadora peace process, and, if that bears no fruit, investigate new diplomatic initiatives of our own. Peace will never come to Central America from the barrel of a gun, and we should disapprove the President's ill-timed and ill-conceived request for additional military aid to the Contras.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. President, it seems that those who oppose this amendment really are

making this case: Let us continue to support a bipartisan policy which we helped design and implement over the past 5 years. But this body has not been involved in the shaping or formulation of this policy, and the explanation for this policy has been shifting.

First of all, we were told that we supported Contra aid in order to interdict military weapons going into El Salvador. That was the first justification for administration policy.

Second, the administration said we should support Contra aid in order to see the liberalization of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. That was the second justification.

The third justification was to force the Sandinistas to come to the bargaining table. That was the third justification.

Now we know the real reason and purpose of this policy: The administration wants to overthrow the Sandinista government.

That is what the Contras understand and that is what this administration understands. And now we are again expected to sign off that particular policy.

We have not been involved in the shaping of that policy and once again today we are asked to go ahead and support it.

We advocate a return to the Contadora process. The Latin American countries that represent 90 percent of the population and 90 percent of the territory and 90 percent of the resources of the continent believe that we should halt our support for the Contras. We stand alone in this hemisphere and in the world. We are separated from our allies in the hemisphere, and we are separated from our allies in Western Europe. It is time, Mr. President, to reverse this policy, to stop supporting the Contras, and to move back toward negotiations.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DURENBERGER). The Senator from Indiana has 2 minutes and 38 seconds.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts has offered an important amendment. As he states, it offers a very clear choice. I think the choice is so clear that most Members on both sides of the aisle would commend the Senator for offering this amendment in order to clear the air at the outset. But I think that it is deficient in terms of any practical use if we are serious about negotiations and if we are serious about improving our relationship not only with the country of Nicaragua but most of the rest of Central America.

In short, we have tried the Senator's prescription before. Inadvertently, though perhaps some would say delib-

erately, we cut off all assistance to the Contras for a period of time.

The Senator from Massachusetts argued that our policy has led to increased militarization, increased repression by the Nicaraguans of their own people; it has led in essence to all sorts of results. But in fact, it appears, I think for most readers of history, that the Sandinistas, at least those that remain from the original revolution—the Ortega types, the Borge types, the Marxists—were intent upon the kind of revolution they now have. In my judgment, they will continue until they have collectivized the country. They have done so whether we were sending arms or not sending arms to the Contras.

It seems to me a fairly large majority of us on both sides of the aisle want to talk seriously about how negotiations might work. Phil Habib, the President's negotiator, has said "Negotiations will work only if there is a vote in the House and a vote in the Senate that I, Phil Habib, have going with me."

"Otherwise, they are a gesture of futility because there is no reason for the Sandinistas to at least cough up one concession."

I agree with Philip Habib. I agree with the President who wants to give these negotiations a real try. I agree with Members on both sides of the aisle, a large majority, who are thinking very carefully about how the situation might be crafted in which those negotiations will have a better chance. For that reason, I ask my colleagues to oppose the Senator's amendment. I agree it offers a clear choice and I hope that will be reflected in the votes that will be cast.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, how much time do I have left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute, fifty-four seconds.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself the remaining time.

I still have not heard an answer to the petition from the Latin American countries themselves, from Sarney of Brazil, Alfonsín of Argentina, García of Peru, Sanguinetti of Uruguay, and Betancur of Colombia. These leaders are concerned about the future of their region, concerned about peace, and they deplore communism.

Many of those individuals fought against the tyranny of repressive governments for years. They say that the biggest obstacle to peace in Central America is the military assistance that the United States continues to provide to the Contras. That is their petition. That is their plea.

Why is it that we believe that we—and we—alone can superimpose a solution in Central America? By providing this kind of aid and assistance to the Contras, we are saying, we will do this unilaterally—against the advice of the