In any discussion of the Central High desegregation of 1957, the figure of Arkansas governor Orval Faubus looms large. The conventional narrative, developed and elaborated over six decades, suggests that the Central High crisis forced Orval Faubus to publicly embrace principles pf segregationists and states' rights and to make common cause with their students with their strident advocates. Previously, his pragmatic political skills had guided him away from such stands, in large part because he knew that such positions would alienate some constituents and jeopardize his political prospects. In 1957, however, Faubus became, for a time, the public face of segregation and state sovereignty. This led to long-lasting political power within Arkansas—he served an unprecedented six terms as governor—but discussions of Faubus’s legacy would inevitably be colored by his actions during the Central High crisis, his own personal elephant in the room.
The Prodigal and the Elephant
Historian David Wallace suggested that instead of marking a departure, Faubus’ actions during the desegregation episode represented logical and perhaps inevitable extensions of his previous views and behavior. When Faubus first campaigned for governor in 1954, he had a meager political background but was personable and plausibly a man of the people, even though his ambition drew him toward centers of power. Seeking an issue on which to campaign, Faubus initially targeted school desegregation. He staked out for himself an ambiguous position: he campaigned on the assertion that Arkansas was not ready for “complete and sudden mixing of the races in the public schools”—wording which allowed him to placate all sides, favoring moderation and gradual change as society itself permitted and local authorities determined. From his words, both integrators and segregators could take comfort, and his espousal of “local option” fit Arkansas‘s political preferences.
In 1955 and 1956, Faubus faced opportunities to put this cautious stance to the test- and discovered unexpected vulnerabilities. When he refused to intervene in the voluntary desegregation of the Hoxie schools in 1955, he was denounced by hard-line segregationists from within his own party, most notably former state senator Jim Johnson of Crossett. In the next year, Johnson mounted a vigorous challenge to Faubus’ re-election, calling the governor spineless and a leftist; ultimately Faubus beat back the challenge, buoyed by strong support from the Delta’s white voters, but he was forced to endorse anti-integration ballot measures also championed by Johnson, effectively nudging him toward an overt embrace of the segregation hard line.
In the legislative session of 1957, Faubus once again found himself forced to endorse and sign segregationist and states’ right-inspired measures. Once the session was over, he backed away from segregationist rhetoric, informing local school boards preparing to desegregate that he would not interfere. And yet, by the end of the summer, Faubus shifted positions yet again as circumstances forced him to reluctantly face confrontation.
During the summer 1957, the Little Rock Schools prepared for implementation of modest desegregation beginning with a single high school: Little Rock Central. In August, citing the possibility of civil unrest, segregationist forces applied enough pressure to extract from Faubus a promise to stop, somehow, Central High School’s integration in the fall.
In the following weeks Faubus moved to fulfill his promise, by turns acting, holding back, extemporizing and prevaricating as expedient. On September 2, he ordered National Guard troops to take up positions at Central the next school day, ensuring that school would operate "on the same basis as they had in the past," i.e., without the nine African-American students slated to enroll. This order set in motion a chain of events that led to the deployment of federal troops at Central High School on September 25 to keep order and facilitate the desegregation. Faubus appeared on television that night and told his constituents that Little Rock was now "occupied territory."
Faubus lost a states' rights battle, but his refusal to comply with Eisenhower's expectations proved to be his electoral golden ticket: He had proved his mettle to the majority of white voters in the state. By the time he left office in January 1967, he could point to a record of solid accomplishments. During his administrations, the state's schools had improved markedly with increased school and college teachers' pay. Industrial development in the state, which stumbled in the wake of the Central High crisis, recovered due in large part to a state law that allowed communities to issue revenue bonds to help underwrite factories. The resultant prosperity paid in turn for paved highways, state parks, and improved public health facilities. The Ozarks-born governor also used some of his considerable political power to help defeat Army Corps of Engineers plans to dam the majestic Buffalo River. But the shadow of 1957 remained the inconvenient elephant that would not leave.
The Prodigal and the Elephant
Faubus's biographer, Roy Reed, wrote that throughout the rest of his life, Faubus would offer various justifications of his actions in 1957. First among these was his professed belief that there had been potential for violence, which, he claimed, he had sought to avoid. He additionally invoked:
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- Principled opposition to power over local affairs concentrating in federal hands;
- The possible illegality of the Supreme Court's Brown decision;
- Federal authorities' duty to enforce their rules with marshals, not soldiers;
- Overwhelming regional rejection of the Brown decision, making compliance politically suicidal.
The first four rationales, Reed argued, were deeply flawed although each contained a kernel of truth or plausibility; the last, he suggested, was demonstrably true and was probably Faubus’ strongest motivation. Faubus could not accomplish much if he were thrown out of office, thus his embrace of states' rights, segregation and attempted interposition was the necessary course of action. Doing so made it possible for Faubus to shepherd fundamental and positive changes in Arkansas during his remaining years in office, but the stigma of 1957 insured that much of the good associated with Orval Faubus and his years of service would be interred with his bones.
Aucoin, Brent. "The Southern Manifesto and Southern Opposition to Desegregation." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 55 (Summer 1996).
Day, John Kyle. The Southern Manifesto: Massive Resistance and the Fight to Preserve Segregation. Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1996.
Reed, Roy. Faubus: The Life and Time of an American Prodigal. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1997.
---. "Orval Faubus: Out of Socialism and Realism." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 54 (Spring 1995).
Vervack, Jerry. "The Hoxie Imbroglio." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 54 (Spring 1995).
Wallace, David. "Orval Faubus: The Central Figure at Little Rock Central High School." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 39 (Winter 1980).
David Ware has served as Arkansas's state capitol historian since 2001. A native of Washington, D.C., Ware received his M.A. in History from the University of Wyoming and Ph.D. from Arizona State University. His professional work has included both teaching and public history in various settings. His research and writing interests include voluntary associations (including reform movements), the western railroads, the American Southwest, and Arkansas’s cultural history.